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The Economics of Labor Market Intermediation: An Analytic Framework

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Author Info
Autor, David () (MIT)

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Abstract

Labor Market Intermediaries (LMIs) are entities or institutions that interpose themselves between workers and firms to facilitate, inform, or regulate how workers are matched to firms, how work is accomplished, and how conflicts are resolved. This paper offers a conceptual foundation for analyzing the economic role played by these understudied institutions, and to develop a qualitative and, in some cases, quantitative sense of their significance to market operation and welfare. Though heterogeneous, I argue that LMIs share a common function, which is to redress – and in some cases exploit – a set of endemic departures of labor market operation from the efficient neoclassical benchmark. At a rudimentary level, LMIs such as online job boards reduce search frictions by aggregating and reselling disparate information at a cost below which workers and firms could obtain themselves. Beyond passively supplying information, a set of LMIs forcibly redress adverse selection problems in labor markets by compelling workers and firms to reveal normally hidden credentials, such as criminal background, academic standing, or financial integrity. At their most forceful, LMIs such as labor unions and centralized job matching clearinghouses resolve coordination and collective action failures in markets by tightly controlling – even monopolizing – the process by which workers and firms meet, match and negotiate. A unifying observation of the analytic framework is that participation in the activities of a given LMI are typically voluntary for one side of the market and compulsory for the other; workers cannot, for example, elect to suppress their criminal records and firms cannot opt out of collective bargaining. I argue that the nature of participation in an LMI’s activities – voluntary or compulsory, and for which parties – is dictated by the market imperfection that it addresses and thus tells us much about its economic function.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3705.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3705

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Related research
Keywords: intermediation; unions; job search; internet; temporary-help; adverse selection; collective action;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
J8 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Kuhn & Mikal Skuterud, 2004. "Internet Job Search and Unemployment Durations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 218-232, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. David Autor & Susan Houseman, 2005. "Do Temporary Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes
    for Low-Skilled Workers? Evidence from Random Assignments
    ," Staff Working Papers 05-124, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David H. Autor, 2001. "Wiring the Labor Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 25-40, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Katharine G. Abraham, 1988. "Flexible Staffing Arrangements and Employers' Short-Term Adjustment Strategies," NBER Working Papers 2617, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. David H. Autor, 2003. "Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 1-42, January. [Downloadable!]
  6. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-93, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Segal, Lewis M & Sullivan, Daniel G, 1997. "The Growth of Temporary Services Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 117-36, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(2), pages 217-27, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Joseph G. Altonji & Todd E. Elder & Christopher R. Taber, 2005. "Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 151-184, February.
    Other versions:
  10. Kaushik Basu, 2003. "The Economics and Law of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 141-157, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Susan N. Houseman, 2001. "Why employers use flexible staffing arrangements: Evidence from an establishment survey," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 55(1), pages 149-170, October.
  12. Carolyn J. Heinrich & Peter R. Mueser & Kenneth R. Troske, 2005. "Welfare to Temporary Work: Implications for Labor Market Outcomes," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 154-173, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. David H. Autor, 2001. "Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide Free General Skills Training?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1409-1448, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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