Can public policy interfere with culture, such as beliefs and norms of cooperation? We investigate his question by evaluating the interactions between the State and the Civil Society, focusing on the labor market. International data shows a negative correlation between union density and the quality of labor relations on one hand, and state regulation of the minimum wage on the other hand. To explain this relation, we develop a model of learning of the quality of labor relations. State regulation crowds out the possibility for workers to experiment negotiation and learn about the true cooperative nature of participants in the labor market. This crowding out effect can give rise to multiple equilibria: a "good" equilibrium characterized by strong beliefs in cooperation, leading to high union density and low state regulation; and a "bad" equilibrium, characterized by distrustful labor relations, low union density and strong state regulation of the minimum wage. We then use surveys on social attitudes and unionization behavior to document the relation between minimum wage legislation and the beliefs about the scope of cooperation in the labor market.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3680.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
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Other versions:
Philippe Aghion & Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & Andrei Shleifer, 2009.
"Regulation and Distrust,"
Working Papers
hal-00396268_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!]
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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