The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models
AbstractA standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 342.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Economics Letters, 2002, 75 (2), 171-178
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Other versions of this item:
- Schnedler, Wendelin, 2002. "The virtue of being underestimated: a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 171-178, April.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2001. "The Virtue of Being Underestimated: A Note on Discriminatory Contracts in Hidden Information Models," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse18_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-09-26 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
- Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2009.
"You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income, and Effort,"
The Centre for Market and Public Organisation
09/226, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- Wendelin Schnedler, 2011. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income and Effort," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 1-10, 02.
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