‘Arranged’ Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: A Model with Evidence from India
AbstractWe model the consequences of parental control over choice of wives for sons, for parental incentives to educate daughters, when the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments and altruistic but paternalistic parents benefit from having married sons live with them. By choosing uneducated brides, some parents can prevent costly household partition. Paternalistic self-interest consequently generates low levels of female schooling in the steady state equilibrium. State payments to parents for educating daughters fail to raise female schooling levels. Policies (such as housing subsidies) that promote nuclear families, interventions against early marriages, and state support to couples who marry against parental wishes, are however all likely to improve female schooling. We offer evidence from India consistent with our theoretical analysis.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3336.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Mukhopadhyay, H. et al. (eds.), Dimensions of Economic Theory and Policy, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Indraneel Dasgupta, & Pushkar Maitra, & Diganta Mukherjee, . "'Arranged' Marriage, Co-Residence and Female Schooling: a Model with Evidence from India," Discussion Papers 06/03, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2008-03-15 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-DEV-2008-03-15 (Development)
- NEP-LAB-2008-03-15 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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