Interdependency in Performance
AbstractWe empirically model performance in the final round of a multiple-round tournament as a spatially autoregressive process, allowing us to sign and quantify the endogenous interactions between competitors. Doing so speaks to significant regularities in the data that suggest that a player’s own performance generally tends to improve with the improving performance of competitors. However, we also find significant asymmetries in the interdependency of player performance that suggest that social interactions, even those found in a fairly straightforward game, can be rather complex. For example, while the positive complementarity in performance is particularly strong between tied players, own performance suffers in response to improving performance of lagging, lower-ability competitors.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2944.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
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- Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008.
"Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3440, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00276396, HAL.
- Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Post-Print halshs-00451557, HAL.
- Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
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