Unemployment Traps: Do Financial Disincentives Matter?
AbstractThis paper analyses the importance of financial dis-incentives for workers in Denmark. Based on a panel survey which is merged to a number of administrative registers it is possible to calculate precise measures of the economic incentives for labour force participants between employment in a full time job and being on unemployment insurance benefits and considering also the fixed costs of work. The results indicate large dis-incentives effects for some groups, especially low paid women. In 1996, 6 per cent of Danish men and 13 per cent of the women had a lower disposable net income if working in a full-time job compared to being on unemployment benefits. The effect of these financial dis-incentives is analysed in simple reduced form models of on-the-job search, unemployed search behaviour, unemployment risk, and transitions out of the labour force. We find that the net compensation rate in unemployment has a significant impact on women’s propensity to leave the labour force, on measures of search intensity, on the risk of being hit by unemployment and on one of our flexibility measures, i.e. the maximum acceptable commuting time to a job. The net compensation rate has no impact on the willingness to move to another place to get a job. However, here we find a significant impact from job attitude related measures. We end the paper reporting the results from including attitude variables along with economic variables. We find a number of significant effects from attitude variables. However, the main conclusion is that economic incentives dominate the present analysis of unemployment traps.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 274.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: European Sociological Review, 2002, 18 (3), 271-288; see IZA Reprints 173/03
Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Pedersen, Peder J. & Smith, Nina, 2002. "Unemployment Traps: Do Financial Dis-incentives matter?," CLS Working Papers 01-1, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research.
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999.
"Efficient Unemployment Insurance,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October.
- Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R., 1997. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Working papers 97-9, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Pissarides, C. & Wadsworth, J., 1988. "On-The-Job Search: Some Empirical Evidence," Papers 317, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
- Holmlund, B., 1997.
"Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
380, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University.
- Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998.
"The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
- Christopher A. Pissarides, 1997. "The Impact of Employment Tax Cuts on Unemployment and Wages: The Role of Unemployment Benefits and Tax Structure," CEP Discussion Papers dp0361, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Callan, T. & Dex, S. & Smith, N. & Vlasblom, J.D., 1999. "Taxation of Spouses: a Cross-Country Study of the Effects on Maaried Women's Labour Supply," Papers 99-02, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark-.
- Atkinson, A.B., 1987. "Income maintenance and social insurance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 13, pages 779-908 Elsevier.
- Graversen, E.K. & Smith, N., 1998. "Labour Supply, Overtime Work and Taxation in Denmark," Papers 98-06, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Danmark-.
- Andrew Dilnot & Alan Duncan, 1992. "Lone mothers, family credit and paid work," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 13(1), pages 1-21, February.
- Torben Andersen, 2010. "Why do Scandinavians Work?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3068, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kohns, Stephan, 2001. "Testing for Asymmetry in British, German and US Unemployment Data," IZA Discussion Papers 341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Torben M. Andersen, 2009. "Taxes and employment - is there a Scandinavia puzzle ?," European Economy - Economic Papers 359, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- D'Addio, Anna Cristina & De Greef, Isabelle & Rosholm, Michael, 2002.
"Assessing Unemployment Traps in Belgium Using Panel Data Sample Selection Models,"
IZA Discussion Papers
669, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Anna Cristina d'Addio & Isabelle De Greef & Michael Rosholm, 2002. "Assessing Unemployment Traps in Belgium using Panel Data Sample Selection models," 10th International Conference on Panel Data, Berlin, July 5-6, 2002 C1-3, International Conferences on Panel Data.
- Kamil Galuscak & Jan Pavel, 2012. "Taxes and Benefits: Work Incentive Effects of Policies," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(1), pages 27-43, February.
- Konstantinos Tatsiramos, 2009.
"Geographic labour mobility and unemployment insurance in Europe,"
Journal of Population Economics,
Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 267-283, April.
- Tatsiramos, Konstantinos, 2004. "Geographic Labour Mobility and Unemployment Insurance in Europe," IZA Discussion Papers 1253, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Nisar Ahmad & Rayhaneh Esmaeilzadeh, 2009. "Immigrant-Native Differences in Earnings Mobility Processes: Evidence from Canadian and Danish Data," Economics Working Papers 2009-13, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
- Rosholm, Michael & Vejlin, Rune Majlund, 2007.
"Reducing Income Transfers to Refugee Immigrants: Does Starthelp Help You Start?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2720, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Rosholm, Michael & Vejlin, Rune, 2010. "Reducing income transfers to refugee immigrants: Does start-help help you start?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 258-275, January.
- Kamil Galuscak & Jan Pavel, 2007. "Unemployment and Inactivity Traps in the Czech Republic: Incentive Effects of Policies," Working Papers 2007/9, Czech National Bank, Research Department.
- Rosholm, Michael & Roed, Marianne & Schone, Pal, 2006. "Are New Work Practices and New Technologies Biased against Immigrant Workers?," IZA Discussion Papers 2135, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.