Wage Rigidity or Fiscal Redistribution? The Unemployment Bias of Time Consistent Redistributive Policies
AbstractBecause of Time Inconsistency considerations, policymakers underestimate the drawbacks of wage rigidity as a redistributive tool. Consequently, they redistribute inefficiently income from high to low skilled workers. They typically implement too much wage rigidity whereas other means (in particular fiscal transfers) could achieve the same redistributive goal with less perverse effect on unemployment. Time inconsistency is more likely due to lack of credibility than to the short-term horizon of policymakers. Hence, policymaking processes should be reformed towards more transparent and binding agreements between government and social partners.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2116.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2006-05-20 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-20 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Agell, Jonas & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1997. "Minimum wages and the incentives for skill formation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 25-40, April.
- Yann Algan & Pierre Cahuc & André Zylberberg, 2002.
"Public employment and labour market performance,"
CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 17(34), pages 7-66, 04.
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