A Constitutional Theory of the Family
AbstractThe paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1797.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Population Economics, 2006, 19 (2), 259-289
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Cigno, 2005. "A constitutional theory of the family," CHILD Working Papers, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY wp14_05, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
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- Cigno, Alessandro & Giannelli, Gianna Claudia & Rosati, Furio C. & Vuri, Daniela, 2004.
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1116, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Alessandro Cigno & Gianna Giannelli & Furio Rosati & Daniela Vuri, 2006. "Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 183-204, 09.
- Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
- Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November.
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