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A Constitutional Theory of the Family

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Author Info
Alessandro Cigno () (University of Florence, CESifo, CHILD and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1797.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1797

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Related research
Keywords: families; self-enforcing constitutions; renegotiation-proofness; altruism; fertility; saving; transfers; attention; pensions; credit rationing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gary S. Becker & Robert J. Barro, 1988. "A Reformulation of the Economic Theory of Fertility," NBER Working Papers 1793, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cigno, Alessandro & Giannelli, Gianna C. & Rosati, Furio C. & Vuri, Daniela, 2004. "Is There Such a Thing as a Family Constitution? A Test Based on Credit Rationing," IZA Discussion Papers 1116, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cigno, Alessandro, 1993. "Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and state," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 505-518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francesca Francavilla & Gianna Claudia Giannelli, 2007. "The Relation between Child Labour and Mothers’ Work: The Case of India," IZA Discussion Papers 3099, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Francavilla, Francesca & Giannelli, Gianna Claudia & Grilli, Leonardo, 2008. "School Attendance of Children and the Work of Mothers: A Joint Multilevel Model for India," IZA Discussion Papers 3531, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alessandro Cigno & Gianna Giannelli & Furio Rosati & Daniela Vuri, 2006. "Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 183-204, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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