Moral Hazard and Cash Benefits in Long-Term Home Care
AbstractThis paper tests empirically for ex-post moral hazard in a system based on demand-side subsidies. In the Netherlands, demand-side subsidies were introduced in 1996. Clients receive a cash benefit to purchase the type of home care (housework, personal care, support with mobility, organisational tasks or social support) they need from the care supplier of their choice (private care provider, regular care agency, commercial care agency or paid informal care provider). Furthermore, they negotiate with the care supplier about price and quantity. Our main findings are the following. 1) The component of the cash benefit a client has no residual claimant on, has a positive impact on the price of care. 2) In contrast, the components of the cash benefit a client has residual claimant on, have no or a negative impact on the price of care. Both results point at the existence of ex-post moral hazard in a system of demand-side subsidies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1532.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as "Cash benefits in long-term home care" in: Health Policy, 2008, 88 (2-3), 209-221
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Other versions of this item:
- Bernard van den Berg & W.H.J. Hassink, 2004. "Moral hazard and cash benefits in long-term home care," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 04-25, Utrecht School of Economics.
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Robin McKnight, 2004.
"Home Care Reimbursement, Long-term Care Utilization,And Health Outcomes,"
University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers, University of Oregon Economics Department
2004-6, University of Oregon Economics Department.
- McKnight, Robin, 2006. "Home care reimbursement, long-term care utilization, and health outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 293-323, January.
- Robin McKnight, 2004. "Home Care Reimbursement, Long-term Care Utilization, and Health Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 10414, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, Elsevier, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions Of The Economics Of Information To Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478, November.
- Rinaldo Brau & Matteo Lippi Bruni & Anna Maria Pinna, 2010. "Public versus private demand for covering long-term care expenditures," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(28), pages 3651-3668.
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