Charity Auctions: A Field Experimental Investigation
AbstractAuctions are a popular way to raise money for charities, but relatively little is known, either theoretically or empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct field experiments to test which sealed bid format, first price, second price or all-pay raises the most money. Our experiment suggests that both the all-pay and second price formats are dominated by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the difference between existing theory and the field. To conclude, we show that a model of charity auctions augmented by an endogenous participation decision predicts the revenue ordering that we see in the field.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1330.
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Economic Journal, 2008, 118 (525), 92-113
Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- Peter Hans Matthews & Jeffrey Carpenter & Jessica Holmes, 2004. "Charity Auctions: A Field Experimental Investigation," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0417, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
- C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Klemperer, 1999.
"Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature,"
Economics Series Working Papers
1999-W12, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Klemperer, Paul, 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," CEPR Discussion Papers 2163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Microeconomics 9903002, EconWPA.
- John List & David Reiley, 2008.
Artefactual Field Experiments
00091, The Field Experiments Website.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1994. "Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 339-346, May.
- Maxim Engers & Brian McManus, 2007. "Charity Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 953-994, 08.
- Heckman, James, 2013.
"Sample selection bias as a specification error,"
Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
- ehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1994.
"How (not) to sell nuclear weapons,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
288, University of Bonn, Germany.
- John List & Matti Liski, 2005. "Introduction," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(2), pages 121-121, 06.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- David Lucking-Reiley, 1999.
"Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1063-1080, December.
- David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments 00183, The Field Experiments Website.
- Laffont, J.J., 1996.
"Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data,"
95.394, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal, 2009. "Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 431-457, 05.
- Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-58, December.
- Morgan, John & Sefton, Martin, 2000. "Funding Public Goods with Lotteries: Experimental Evidence," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 785-810, October.
- David Lucking-Reiley & John A. List, 2000. "Demand Reduction in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 961-972, September.
- Gadi Fibich & Arieh Gavious & Aner Sela, 2006. "All-pay auctions with risk-averse players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 583-599, November.
- Stegeman, Mark, 1996. "Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 228-259, October.
- Samuelson, William F., 1985. "Competitive bidding with entry costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 53-57.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
- Douglas D. Davis & Laura Razzolini & Robert Reilly & Bart J. Wilson, 2003. "Raising Revenues for Charity: Auctions versus Lotteries," Working Papers 0301, VCU School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Stephan Meier, 2006. "Does framing matter for conditional cooperation? Evidence from a natural field experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00309, The Field Experiments Website.
- Juan Camilo Cardenas & Rajiv Sethi, 2010. "Resource Allocation in Public Agencies: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 815-836, 08.
- Fong, Christina M. & Luttmer, Erzo F. P., 2007.
"What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Income, Race, and Fairness,"
Working Paper Series
rwp07-032, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Christina Fong & Erzo Luttmer, 2007. "What determines giving to hurricane katrina victims? Experimental evidence on income, race, and fairness," Artefactual Field Experiments 00046, The Field Experiments Website.
- Christina M. Fong & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2007. "What Determines Giving to Hurricane Katrina Victims? Experimental Evidence on Income, Race, and Fairness," NBER Working Papers 13219, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yongfu He & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc, 2013. "The impact of jump bidding in online auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 387-397, December.
- Juan Camilo Cárdenas & Rajiv Sethi, 2007. "Attitudes and attributes: a field experiment with public officials and transfer recipients In Colombia," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 006881, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.