Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism
AbstractWe use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1227.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Public Choice, 2007, 132 (3-4), 257-271
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Other versions of this item:
- Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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