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Understanding the Development of Fundamentalism

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  • Gang, Ira N.

    ()
    (Rutgers University)

  • Epstein, Gil S.

    ()
    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

We use economic theory to examine the intensity of fundamentalist sects. Leaders work to enhance their followers’ observance level. We model three stylized situations under which fundamentalist groups function, examining the intensity of observance in each. We find that, under reasonable conditions, rivalry among fundamentalists makes them more extreme.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 1227.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Public Choice, 2007, 132 (3-4), 257-271
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1227

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Keywords: religion; fundamentalism; rent-seeking;

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References

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  1. Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1993. "Terrorism and signalling," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 383-397, August.
  2. Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, 2003. "An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 132-, March.
  3. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
  4. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "Government and Cities: Contests and the Decentralization of Decision Making," Departmental Working Papers, Rutgers University, Department of Economics 200215, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  6. Eli Berman, 2000. "Sect, Subsidy, And Sacrifice: An Economist'S View Of Ultra-Orthodox Jews," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 905-953, August.
  7. Laurence R. Iannaccone, 1997. "Toward an Economic Theory of "Fundamentalism"," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(1), pages 100-, March.
  8. Iannaccone, Laurence R, 1992. "Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 271-91, April.
  9. Timur Kuran, 1989. "Sparks and prairie fires: A theory of unanticipated political revolution," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 41-74, April.
  10. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  11. Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
  12. Dwight Lee & Todd Sandler, 1989. "On the optimal retaliation against terrorists: The paid-rider option," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 61(2), pages 141-152, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Cerqueti, Roy & Correani, Luca & Garofalo, Giuseppe, 2013. "Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 458-463.
  2. Luca CORREANI & Fabio DI DIO & Giuseppe GAROFALO, 2010. "The Evolutionary Dynamics of Tolerance," Theoretical and Practical Research in Economic Fields, ASERS Publishing, ASERS Publishing, vol. 0(2), pages 219 - 231, December.
  3. Robbert Maseland & André Hoorn, 2011. "Why Muslims like democracy yet have so little of it," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 481-496, June.
  4. Arce, Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2009. "Fitting in: Group effects and the evolution of fundamentalism," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 739-757, September.

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