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Un estudio sobre el papel clasificador de las garantías en los mercados de crédito con información asimétrica

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Author Info

  • C. Mónica Capra

    (Washington University)

  • Irene Ramírez Comeig

    (Universitat de València)

  • Matilde O. Fernández Blanco

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

This paper tests Bester's (1985, 1987) prediction about the separating role ofcontracts that involve both interest rates and collateral in credit markets. To test thisprediction we use data from natural credit markets and controlled experiments. Using asample of credits to small and medium size firms in Valencia, Spain, we relate twodifferent types of contracts with the ex post risk type of the borrower and other relevantvariables. We then design two incentive compatible contracts and analyze decisionsunder two different experimental treatments, one with moral hazard. Our empiricalresults confirm that borrowers of ex post lower risk choose contracts with highercollateral and lower interest rate. However, we find that moral hazard could reduceseparation. En este trabajo se examinan las tesis de Bester (1985, 1987) sobre el efecto clasificador de los contratos de préstamo que combinan los requisitos de garantía y tipo de interés. Para ello, empleamos dos métodos de análisis complementarios: un análisis empírico tradicional y un análisis experimental. En el primero, sobre una muestra de préstamos a Pymes de la Comunidad Valenciana, relacionamos dos tipos de contratos con el riesgo ex post del prestatario y otras variables relevantes del contrato y/o de la empresa. En el segundo, diseñamos dos contratos incentivo-compatibles y analizamos las elecciones de los individuos en dos entornos: con y sin riesgo moral. Nuestros resultados empíricos y experimentales confirman que los prestatarios de menor riesgo ex post se concentran en los contratos de mayor garantía y menor tipo de interés. Sin embargo, encontramos evidencia experimental de que la existencia de riesgo moral podría reducir la eficacia en la clasificación.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasec/wpasec-2001-25.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 2001
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number 2001-25.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2001-25

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Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
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Related research

Keywords: Mercado de crédito; garantías; contratos incentivo-compatibles; información asimétrica; riesgo moral Credit markets; incentive compatible contracts; asymmetric information; moral hazard; experiments;

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