Since 1950 Nash solution has been applied to solve most bargaining problems in the field of Labor Economics. In the present paper we show that this solution might not be appropriateunder uncertainty over the state of nature and a fixed labor supply due to the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom. Desde 1950 la solución propuesta por Nash ha sido aplicada mecánicamente en la mayor parte de los problemas de negociación que se plantean en Economía Laboral. En este trabajo demostramos que la solución de Nash no debe utilizarse en aquellas situaciones en las que existe un número de trabajadores fijo e incertidumbre sobre el estado de la naturaleza debido al incumplimiento del, frecuentemente ignorado, axioma de concavidad.
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Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number
1999-05.
Find related papers by JEL classification: J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
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