Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Corresponsabilización fiscal de dos niveles de gobierno: relaciones principal-agente

Contents:

Author Info

  • Francisco Pérez García

    ()
    (Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas)

  • Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren

    ()
    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the problems in designing a tax sharing system when there are two governments levels with rights over the same taxes. Using a principal-agent model, the optimality of the different tax sharing systems is discussed. The presence of efficiency problems derived from the lack of cooperation between governments is proved, using Bernheim & Winstons (1986) common agency theorems. It is finally shown how a cooperative result can be institutionally induced by creating, for example, a Common Tax Agency in which all implicated governments participate. El trabajo analiza los problemas de diseño de un sistema de participación en la gestión tributaria cuando existen dos niveles de gobierno con derechos sobre los mismos tributos. Con la ayuda de un esquema principal-agente, se discute la optimalidad de los resultados de los distintos sistemas de participación tributaria. Haciendo uso de los teoremas sobre agencia común de Bernheim y Winston (1986) se prueba la existencia de problemas de eficiencia derivados de la falta de cooperación entre los gobiernos. Finalmente se muestra cómo el resultado cooperativo podría ser inducido mediante algún remedio institucional, como la creación de una Agencia Tributaria Común, participada por todos los gobiernos implicados.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasec/wpasec-1992-08.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1992
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie EC with number 1992-08.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jul 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1992-08

Contact details of provider:
Postal: C/ Guardia Civil, 22, Esc 2a, 1o, E-46020 VALENCIA
Phone: +34 96 319 00 50
Fax: +34 96 319 00 55
Email:
Web page: http://www.ivie.es/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1992-08. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Departamento de Edición).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.