This paper explores the relative progressivity of the main bankruptcy rules in taxation problems. A rule F is more progressive than a rule G when the after-tax income vector generated by F Lorenz dominates that generated by G. We focus our analysis on four classical rules (proportional, equal-awards, equal-losses and Talmud) and on the TAL-family, introduced in Moreno-Ternero & Villar (2002). This family depends on a parameter Theta belongs to [0,1] and encompasses the constrained equal awards rule, the constrained equal losses rules and the Talmud rule.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number
2002-15.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Moulin, Herve, 2002.
"Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,
in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: