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Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lesson from Principal-Agent Theory II

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  • Huffman, Wallace E.
  • Just, Richard E.

Abstract

At least since the 1950s, studies have shown unusually high productivity of public agricultural research (e.g., Griliches; Huffman and Evenson; Ruttan; Schultz). In response, many have asked why more funds are not allocated to public agricultural research. More recently, following the large budget deficits of the 1980s, funding conditions have tightened and forced both the research agencies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and many of the state agricultural experiment stations (SAES) into a contracting mode. Under unprecedented budget pressures, administrators and public decision makers have struggled to set priorities to reduce budgets without significant loss of productivity. In response, considerable debate has emerged over the last decade about how to organize and manage agricultural research (e.g., Alston, Norton, and Pardey; Huffman and Just 1994, 1999a; Just and Huffman).

Suggested Citation

  • Huffman, Wallace E. & Just, Richard E., 1999. "Setting Efficient Incentives for Agricultural Research: Lesson from Principal-Agent Theory II," ISU General Staff Papers 199908010700001321, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genstf:199908010700001321
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven D. Levitt, 1995. "Optimal Incentive Schemes When Only the Agents' "Best" Output Matters to the Principal," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 744-760, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huffman, Wallace, 2005. "Developments in the Organization and Finance of Public Agricultural Research in the United States, 1988-1999," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12485, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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