Allocation and Leakage in Regional Cap-And-Trade Markets for CO2
AbstractThe allocation or assignment of emissions allowances is among the most contentious elements of the design of emissions trading systems. �Policy-makers usually try to satisfy a range of goals through the allocation process, including easing the transition costs for high-emissions firms, reducing leakage to unregulated regions, and mitigating the impact of the regulations on product prices such as electricity. �In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the US western electricity market to assess the potential impacts of various allocation proposals. �Several proposals involve the ``updating'' of allowance allocation, where the allocation is tied to the ongoing output of plants. �These allocation proposals are designed with the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigating leakage, and of mitigating the costs to high-emissions firms. �However, �some forms of allocation updating can also inflate allowance prices, thereby limiting the benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms. � Thus, the anticipated benefits from allocation updating can be diluted and further distortions introduced into the trading system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 31804.
Date of creation: 02 Jul 2010
Date of revision:
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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More information through EDIRC
electricity markets; Cap-and-Trade; Emissions Leakage;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-08-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-08-06 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-08-06 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-08-06 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sterner, Thomas & Muller, Adrian, 2006.
"Output and Abatement Effects of Allocation Readjustment in Permit Trade,"
dp-06-49, Resources For the Future.
- Muller, Adrian & Sterner, Thomas, 2009. "Output and Abatement Effects of Allocation Readjustment in Permit Trade," Working Papers in Economics 413, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Neuhoff, K. & Keats, K. & Sato, M., 2006. "Allocation, incentives and distortions: the impact of EU ETS emissions allowance allocations to the electricity sector," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0642, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Damien Demailly & Philippe Quirion, 2006. "CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage in the European cement industry under the EU ETS: Grandfathering vs. output-based allocation," Post-Print halshs-00639327, HAL.
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