Capacity Withholding in Restructured Wholesale Power Markets: An Agent-Based Test Bed Study
AbstractThis study uses a dynamic 5-bus test case implemented via the AMES Wholesale Power Market Test Bed to investigate strategic capacity withholding by generation companies (GenCos) in restructured wholesale power markets under systematically varied demand conditions. The strategic behaviors of the GenCos are simulated by means of a stochastic reinforcement learning algorithm motivated by human-subject laboratory experiments. The learning GenCos attempt to improve their earnings over time by strategic selection of their reported supply offers. This strategic selection can involve both physical capacity withholding (reporting of lower-than-true maximum operating capacity) and economic capacity withholding (reporting of higher-than-true marginal costs). We explore the ability of demand conditions to mitigate incentives for capacity withholding by letting demand bids vary from 100% fixed demand to 100% price-sensitive demand. Related work can be accessed at: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/AMESMarketHome.htm
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 13070.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
market power; capacity withholding; Wholesale power markets; electricity; Agent-based test bed; AMES;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy
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- Li, Hongyan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2012.
"Co-learning patterns as emergent market phenomena: An electricity market illustration,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 395-419.
- Li, Hongyan & Tesfatsion, Leigh, 2010. "Co-Learning Patterns As Emergent Market Phenomena: An Electricity Market Illustration," Staff General Research Papers 32222, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Li, Hongyan & Sun, Junjie & Tesfatsion, Leigh S., 2009. "Separation and Volatility of Locational Marginal Prices in Restructured Wholesale Power Markets," Staff General Research Papers 13075, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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