This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition (The)

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Marette, Stéphan

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/research/webpapers/paper_12718.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12718.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12718

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Stephanie Bridges).

Related research
Keywords: information market structure safety standard.

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Garella, Paolo G., 2006. ""Innocuous" minimum quality standards," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 368-374, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Scarpa, Carlo, 1998. "Minimum quality standards with more than two firms1," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 665-676, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Regulation of Product Safety Design through Product Testing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 255-76, May.
  5. Paolo Garella & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2005. "Minimum Quality Standards and Consumers Information," Working Papers 0510, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Marette, Stephan & Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Gozlan, Estelle, 2000. "Product Safety Provision and Consumers' Information," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(4), pages 426-41, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
  11. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  12. Valletti, Tommaso M, 2000. "Minimum Quality Standards under Cournot Competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 235-45, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1384, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Constantatos, Christos & Perrakis, Stylianos, 1998. "Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Mason, Charles F & Sterbenz, Frederic P, 1994. "Imperfect Product Testing and Market Size," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(1), pages 61-86, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Lutz, Stefan & Lyon, Thomas P & Maxwell, John W, 2000. "Quality Leadership When Regulatory Standards Are Forthcoming," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(3), pages 331-48, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Stephan Marette & John Crespi, 2005. "The Financing of Regulatory Agencies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 95-113, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ecchia, Giulio & Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 101-13, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Carriquiry, Miguel A. & Babcock, Bruce A., 2004. "Reputations, Market Structure, and the Choice of Quality Assurance Systems in the Food Industry," Staff General Research Papers 12215, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. Jaehong Kim, 1997. "Inefficiency of the Subgame Optimal Entry Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 25-36, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Maxwell, John W., 1998. "Minimum quality standards as a barrier to innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 355-360, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Marino, Anthony M, 1995. "Are Safety and Environmental Performance Standards Optimal Regulatory Instruments?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 167-79, September.
  26. Lapan, Harvey E. & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2006. "Grading, Minimum Quality Standards, and the Labeling of Genetically Modified Products," Staff General Research Papers 12553, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  27. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-46, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Chan, Yuk-Shee & Marino, Anthony M, 1994. "Regulation of Product Safety Characteristics under Imperfect Observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-95, May.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. stephan marette, 2008. "Standards and Labels," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 16000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.