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Parallel Research, Multiple Intellectual Property Right Protection Instruments, and the Correlation among R&D Projects

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Author Info
Bulut, Harun
Moschini, GianCarlo

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Abstract

The choice of a research path in attacking scientific and technological problems is a significant component of firms’ R&D strategy. One of the findings of the patent races literature is that, in a competitive market setting, firms’ noncooperative choices of research projects display an excessive degree of correlation, as compared to the socially optimal level. The paper revisits this question in a context in which firms have access to trade secrets, in addition to patents, to assert intellectual property rights (IPR) over their discoveries. We find that the availability of multiple IPR protection instruments can move the paths chosen by firms engaged in an R&D race toward the social optimum.

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Paper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12415.

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Date of creation: 22 Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12415

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Keywords: intellectual property rights; parallel R&D; patent races.;

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  1. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 581-95, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Dilip Mookherjee, 1986. "Portfolio Choice in Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 594-605, Winter.
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  3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
  4. Friedman, David D & Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1991. "Some Economics of Trade Secret Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 61-72, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Luís M. B. Cabral, 2003. "R&D Competition when firms Choose Variance," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(1), pages 139-150, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Cabral, Luis, 1994. "Bias in market R&D portfolios," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 533-547, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Tor Klette & David de Meza, 1986. "Is the Market Biased Against Risky R&D?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 133-139, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Wesley M. Cohen & Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, 2000. "Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)," NBER Working Papers 7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Cabral, Luis M. B., 2002. "Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 471-479, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Arundel, Anthony, 2001. "The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 611-624, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Langinier, Corinne & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2002. "Economics of Patents: An Overview, The," Staff General Research Papers 2061, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Bessen, James, 2005. "Patents and the diffusion of technical information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 121-128, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
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