Team Size and Effort in Start-Up-Teams – Another Consequence of Free-Riding and Peer Pressure in Partnerships
AbstractStart-up-teams are almost always small and very often consist of no more than three members. We present an explanation based on free-riding and peer pressure. Founders choose the size of their start-up-team in order to economize on effort costs of teams. Given the particular business situation of start-ups we show that there should be an optimal team size with regard to effort. We test our implications based on a large start-up data set. Individual effort first rises and then declines with team size; on average maximum effort occurs with three team members.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0054.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision: Mar 2004
Team Size; Peer Pressure; Free riding; Start-up Teams;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rupert Sausgruber, 2005. "Testing for Team Spirit - An Experimental Study," Experimental 0508001, EconWPA.
- Kristensen, Soren Rud & Bech, Mickael & Lauridsen, Jørgen T, 2013. "Who to pay for performance? The choice of organisational level for hospital performance incentives," COHERE Working Paper 2013:5, COHERE - Centre of Health Economics Research, University of Southern Denmark.
- Alwine Mohnen & Kathrin Pokorny & Dirk Sliwka, 2008.
"Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 693-720, October.
- Mohnen, Alwine & Pokorny, Kathrin & Sliwka, Dirk, 2008. "Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3281, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (IBW IT).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.