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Optimal Grading

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Author Info
Robertas Zubrickas () (Stockholm School of Economics)
Abstract

In the framework of static mechanism design games with non- pecuniary rewards, we solve for optimal student grading schemes and attempt to explain the observed mismatch between students? grades and their abilities. The model predicts that the more pes- simistic the teacher is about her students, the more generous she should be in grading them. Generally, the "no distortion at the top" property ceases to hold for optimal contracts with cost- less non-pecuniary rewards, and we argue that the compression of ratings as witnessed in job performance appraisals could be an equilibrium outcome. The presented theoretical ?ndings are strongly supported by empirical evidence from the related litera- ture in psychological and educational measurement.

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File URL: http://www.isu.uzh.ch/leadinghouse/WorkingPapers/0027_lhwpaper.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Economics of Education Working Paper Series with number 0027.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iso:educat:0027

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Related research
Keywords: Mechanism design; non-pecuniary incentives; op- timal grading schemes; mismatch of grades and abilities; com- pression of ratings;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts

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This page was last updated on 2009-10-31.

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