In this paper, we analyse the role of political and institutional variables on the cyclical patterns of central government expenditure and revenue. Working with a sample of 38 OECD and Latin-American countries in 1960-2003, we find that higher levels of income inequality are associated with stronger expenditure procyclicality, and that better institutions do not seem to mitigate this effect. IMF interventions are, in general, statistically insignificant in explaining the cyclical behaviour of expenditure, as well as the degree of development of financial systems. On the revenue side, income inequality leads to less procyclical policies. In general, political and institutional variables explain the cyclicality of government expenditure better than that of revenue.
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Paper provided by Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon. in its series Working Papers with number
2006/19.
Length: Date of creation: 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp192006
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1200-781 LISBON, PORTUGAL Web page: http://www.iseg.utl.pt/departamentos/economia/
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
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