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Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation

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  • Amihai Glazer

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

An agent may be able to address a task at different times, with the state of nature more favorable to the task in some periods over others. Success on a task will therefore more greatly improve the agent's reputation following success on a task if he is constrained in choosing when to address the task than if he enjoys flexibility in timing. These considerations may explain why presidents emphasize achievements in their first hundred days in office, and why performance of the economy in only some quarters of a president's term affect elections.

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File URL: http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/economics/docs/workingpapers/2011-2012/glazer-10.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 111210.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:111210

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Related research

Keywords: Reputation; Principal-agent; Policy making;

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  1. Robert A.J. Dur, 1999. "Why Do Policy Makers Stick to Inefficient Decisions?," Public Economics 9906002, EconWPA.
  2. Klaas J. Beniers & Robert Dur, 2004. "Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-065/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Aug 2005.
  3. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun W. Mukand, 2004. "Policy Gambles," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0407, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
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