Governance and Norms as Determinants of Arming
AbstractIn this paper, we explore two factors that can limit arming and, more generally, the costs of enforcement within and across states: governance or the formal organizations and institutions that help define and enforce property rights, and norms, or the informal arrangements in settling potential disputes. We examine the effects of these two factors in a simple static contest model, in which two sides choose levels of arming and whether to engage in actual conflict or settle in the shadow of conflict. We show how arming critically depends on both governance and norms, and therefore how societies with potentially conflictual relations can make either high or low levels of expenditures on security without any difference in the levels of security they actually enjoy. We also explore how investments in governance can reduce arming.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 111203.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Interstate and intrastate disputes; Conflict; Governance; Norms; Security;
Other versions of this item:
- D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F50 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-25 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anbarci, Nejat & Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2002.
"Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 1-16, September.
- Anbarci, N. & Skaperdas, S. & Syropoulos, C., 2000. "Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms Against Threats Can Have Real Effects," Papers 00-01-19, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Michael McBride & Gary Milante & Stergios Skaperdas, 2009.
"Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity,"
091002, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
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