Kurt Van Dender () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)
Abstract
We use a simple analytical framework to derive pricing rules for oligpolistic airlines at airports that are served by competitive airlines as well. The pricing rules show how the degree of internalization of marginal congestion costs depends on market structure. The analysis illustrates the importance of selecting an accurate representation of market structure, when making recommendations about the desirability of congestion pricing mechanisms.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
060717.