Competitive Proposals to Special Interests
AbstractWe consider electoral competition between two political candidates. Each can target private benefits to some groups. A candidate has an incentive to offer high benefits in the initial period, to deter the other candidate from offering yet higher benefits to the same group in a later period. We describe the equilibrium strategies of the candidates, showing that candidates will intend to target different groups, that groups targeted in the initial period gain larger benefits than groups targeted later, and that the benefits to special interests vary with their number and size.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 060716.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Special interests; Elections;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-04-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2007-04-28 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2007-04-28 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, 2005. "A Drawback Of Electoral Competition," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1318-1348, December.
- Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-35, December.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. " The Power of the Proposal Maker in a Model of Endogenous Agenda Formation," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 1-20, January.
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