Amihai Glazer () (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine) Stef Proost () (Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University of Leuven)
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We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. This model can also explain the decrease over time of user fees for road use.
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Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
060712.
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