The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity
AbstractWe consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. This model can also explain the decrease over time of user fees for road use.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 060712.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Positive analysis of policy-making and implementation; Externalities; Government policy on transportation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-02-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2007-02-10 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-02-10 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-URE-2007-02-10 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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