Sickness and injury leave in France: moral hazard or strain?
AbstractFrom 1997 to 2001, the total payment to compensate for sickness and injury leaves increased dramatically in France. Since this change coincided with a decrease in unemployment rate,three hypothesizes should be proposed as possible explanations consistently with the literature: moral hazard (workers fear less to loose their job, therefore use sickness leave more confidently); strain (workers work longer hours or under more stringent rules); labor-force composition effect (less healthy individuals are incorporated into the labor force). We investigate the first two strands of explanation using a household survey (ESPS) enriched with claims data from compulsory health insurance funds on sickness leaves (EPAS). We model separately number of leaves per individual (cumulative logit) and duration of leaves (random-effect model). According to our findings, in France, the individual propensity to take sickness leave is mainly influenced by strain in the workplace and by a labor-force composition effect. Conditional duration of spells is not well explained at the individual level: the only significant factor is usual weekly work duration. Influence of moral hazard is not clearly ascertained: it has few impact on occurrences of leave and no impact on duration.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IRDES institut for research and information in health economics in its series Working Papers with number DT4.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
Date of revision: Feb 2007
Sickness; Labour Force;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2008-02-16 (Health Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-02-16 (Labour Economics)
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- Sabine Chaupain-Guillot & Olivier Guillot, 2010. "Les déterminants individuels des absences au travail : une comparaison européenne," Working Papers of BETA 2010-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand, 2011. "Durée d’arrêt de travail, salaire et Assurance maladie : application microéconométrique à partir de la base Hygie," Working Papers DT42, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Sep 2011.
- Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand & Camille Regaert, 2012. "Sick Leaves: Understanding Disparities Between French Departments," Working Papers DT50, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Oct 2012.
- Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand & Camille Regaert, 2011. "Arrêts maladie : comprendre les disparités départementales," Working Papers DT39, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Feb 2011.
- Ben Halima Mohamed Ali & Regaert Camille, 2013. "Duration of Sick Leave, Income and Health Insurance: Evidence from French French linked employer-employee data," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 46-55.
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