Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods
AbstractThis paper studies the role of bargaining power in coalition formation when two groups of substantially different agents negotiate over a public good with positive or negative spillovers. Both types of agent are allowed to form coalitions before the negotiations start. The forming of coalitions does or does not increase bargaining power, depending on the type of public good and the impact on the agents not participating in the equilibrium agreements. After analyzing the general game we apply it to North-South negotiations. For a public good with positive spillovers, such as climate change abatement, southern countries increase their bargaining power by forming a coalition when a partial agreement induces larger indirect gains for northern countries not participating in the agreement than for non-participating southern countries. We obtain similar results, with the opposite sign, for the formation of a northern coalition.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC in its series Working Papers with number 1017.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
game theory; bargaining; coalition formation; climate change; international environmental agreements.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adelheid Holl).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.