Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The influence of CEO departure type and board characteristics on firm performance

Contents:

Author Info

  • Wided Bouaine
  • Lanouar Charfeddine
  • Mohamed Arouri
  • Frédéric Teulon

Abstract

This paper uses panel data from 271 U.S. firms to empirically examine the relationship between the departure of a firm’s CEO and that firm’s performance. Results of our analysis reveal a significant relationship between CEO departure type and firm performance. Specifically, we found that the departure of entrenched CEOs negatively affects current and future firm performance. Results also demonstrate that board size and the presence of independent administrators moderates the relationship between CEO departure type and firm performance. This suggests that entrenched CEOs can have informal associations with independent administrators.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ipag.fr/wp-content/uploads/recherche/WP/IPAG_WP_2014_087.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Research, Ipag Business School in its series Working Papers with number 2014-087.

as in new window
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-087

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 184 Boulevard Saint-Germain, 75006 Paris
Phone: 33 1 53 63 36 00
Web page: http://www.ipag.fr
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: departure type; current and future performance; board independence; entrenchment.;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
  2. Oren Fuerst & Sok-Hyon Kang, 1998. "Corporate Governance, Expected Operating Performance, and Pricing," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm108, Yale School of Management.
  3. Farrell, Kathleen A. & Whidbee, David A., 2003. "Impact of firm performance expectations on CEO turnover and replacement decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 165-196, December.
  4. Jensen, Michael C, 1993. " The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(3), pages 831-80, July.
  5. Faleye, Olubunmi, 2007. "Classified boards, firm value, and managerial entrenchment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 501-529, February.
  6. Mark R. Huson, 2001. "Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2265-2297, December.
  7. Michael Firth & Peter M. Y. Fung & Oliver M. Rui, 2006. "Firm Performance, Governance Structure, and Top Management Turnover in a Transitional Economy," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(6), pages 1289-1330, 09.
  8. Narayanan Subramanian & Atreya Chakraborty & Shahbaz Sheikh, 2002. "Performance Incentives, Performance Pressure and Executive Turnover," Finance 0210003, EconWPA, revised 24 Oct 2002.
  9. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
  10. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  11. Parrino, Robert, 1997. "CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 165-197, November.
  12. Laurence Godard & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Caractéristiques et fonctionnement des conseils d'administration français : un état des lieux," Post-Print halshs-00593824, HAL.
  13. DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1997. "Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 115-139, July.
  14. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1996. "Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO," Microeconomics 9602001, EconWPA, revised 09 Oct 1996.
  15. DeFond, Mark L. & Park, Chul W., 1999. "The effect of competition on CEO turnover1," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 35-56, February.
  16. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Rey Dang & Frédéric Teulon, 2014. "Les déterminants organisationnels de la représentation des femmes au sein des conseils d’administration des entreprises du SBF 120," Working Papers 2014-397, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-087. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ingmar Schumacher).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.