Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling
AbstractThis paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this market, agents buy or sell productive time. This implicit market gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader (buyer) at the top and helpers (sellers) below. Relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payoÂ¤s/productivity inequality. This prediction is tested empir ically in the context of professional road cycling. We show that the observed rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in help intensity within team and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Research, Ipag Business School in its series Working Papers with number 2014-044.
Length: 76 pages
Date of creation: 06 Jan 2014
Date of revision:
Hierarchical organization; productive time; helping time; inequality; professional cycling.;
Other versions of this item:
- Bertrand Candelon & Arnaud Dupuy, 2012. "Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling," Working Papers 2012/12, Maastricht School of Management.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-02-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-HIS-2014-02-21 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HRM-2014-02-21 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SPO-2014-02-21 (Sports & Economics)
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