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Problemas de Ação Coletiva: Cooperação e Deserção

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  • Valdir Melo
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    Abstract

    Muitas políticas públicas visam promover, preservar, modificar ou aperfeiçoar ações coletivas. E o desenvolvimento de um país requer ações coletivas abrangentes, complexas. Este texto e mais dois que lhe dão sequência fazem levantamento de: i) duas classes gerais, embora não exclusivas, de situações-problema que carecem de ações coletivas; e ii) tipos de mecanismos úteis para possíveis soluções a tais situações-problema; ou seja, mecanismos para atuar, quer sobre instituições (organizações; normas formais ou legisladas; práticas formais), quer sobre elementos culturais (costumes sociais; moralidade costumeira, valores e crenças costumeiras) de uma sociedade. Nestes textos, um fio condutor é a dimensão estratégica, uma das dimensões da construção e modificação de instituições e elementos culturais. Para isso, lança-se mão de jogos básicos de estratégia como modelos simples para distribuir por classes aqueles problemas. Este primeiro texto trata da situação problemática de cooperação versus deserção, modelada em jogos do dilema dos prisioneiros. Incluem-se situações de disputa por saídas em desastres; de corrida de países por rearmamento; de líderes de partido que se candidatam para perder eleições; de pensamento grupal em comissões; de desinteresse em investir em treinamento de empregados; de engarrafamento de trânsito urbano; de criação de novos municípios ou estados; de fugas de bancos para segurança financeira; de tragédias do pasto comum (commons), ambientais ou não. Many public policies seek to promote, maintain, modify or improve collective actions. The development of a country requires actions that are complex and wide in scope. This and following texts sort out: i) two general classes of problem-situations that lack collective action; and ii) kinds of mechanisms that are useful as possible solutions to such problem-situations; i.e., mechanisms for acting upon institutions (organizations; formal or legal norms; formal practices) or upon cultural elements (social customs; customary morality; customary values and beliefs) of a society. In these texts, a leitmotif is the strategic dimension, one of the dimensions of building or changing institutions and cultural elements. To this end, one takes advantage of basic games of strategy as simple models for assigning those problems into classes. This first text deals with the problem-situation of cooperation vs. defection, modeled as prisoner’s dilemma games. It covers situations of disputes for exits during disasters; of party leaders that become candidates for losing elections; of groupthink in committees; of lack of interest in training employees; of bottlenecks in urban traffic; of creating new city or state governments; of bank runs to financial safety; of tragedies of commons, be they environmental or otherwise.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA in its series Discussion Papers with number 1849.

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    Length: 56 pages
    Date of creation: Jul 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1849

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