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Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Economies: Lessons from Chile and Norway

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  • Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel

Abstract

Resource-rich economies in general, and Arab oil exporters in particular, are at a critical juncture, facing the challenge of revamping their fiscal policy institutions and conduct to strengthen macroeconomic and financial stability, raise growth, and improve intra/inter-generational equity. This paper starts by reviewing the international evidence on fiscal policies and outcomes in resource-rich economies at large and Arab oil-exporting countries in particular, which suggests that strong fiscal (and political) institutions can turn the resource curse into a blessing. Then the paper provides comparative reviews of Chile's and Norway's decade-long experience in setting up new fiscal institutions and rules to manage their resource rents, aiming at and, in fact, attaining more macroeconomic and financial stability, higher growth, and improved equity. Specific reform lessons to strengthen fiscal institutions and policies are drawn for resource-rich economies and Arab oil exporters.

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 2012. "Fiscal Institutions in Resource-Rich Economies: Lessons from Chile and Norway," Documentos de Trabajo 416, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
  • Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:416
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    Cited by:

    1. Raimundo Soto & Ilham Haouas, 2012. "Has the UAE Escaped the Oil Curse?," Working Papers 728, Economic Research Forum, revised 2012.
    2. Andres Solimano & Diego Calderón Guajardo, 2017. "The copper sector, fiscal rules, and stabilization funds in Chile: Scope and limits," WIDER Working Paper Series 053, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Xavier Debrun & Tidiane Kinda, 2017. "Strengthening Post‐Crisis Fiscal Credibility: Fiscal Councils on the Rise – A New Dataset," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 38, pages 667-700, December.
    4. Andrés Solimano & Diego Calderón Guajardo, 2017. "The copper sector, fiscal rules, and stabilization funds in Chile: Scope and limits," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2017-53, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Ashraf Galal Eid, 2015. "Budgetary Institutions, Fiscal Policy, and Economic Growth: the Case of Saudi Arabia," Working Papers 967, Economic Research Forum, revised Nov 2015.
    6. Ghassan Dibeh, 2014. "The Political Economy of Monetary Policy in Resource-Rich Arab Economies," Working Papers 896, Economic Research Forum, revised Dec 2014.
    7. World Bank Group, 2017. "Gulf Economic Monitor, June 2017," World Bank Publications - Reports 27473, The World Bank Group.
    8. Mahmoud Al Iriani & Yahsob Al Eriani, 2015. "Fiscal Institutions and Macroeconomic Managment in Resource Rich Economies: the Case of Yemen," Working Papers 935, Economic Research Forum, revised Aug 2015.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal institutions; Fiscal rules; Resource-rich economies; Chile; Norway;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

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