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Forward Trading in Exhaustible-Resource Oligopoly Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Juan Pablo Montero () (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.)
Matti Liski
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We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries, a market structure prevalent in many resource commodity markets. We find that this organization of trade has substantial implications for resource depletion. As firms’ interactions become infinitely frequent, resource stocks become fully contracted and the symmetric oligopolistic equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive Hotelling (1931) outcome. Asymmetries in stock holdings allow firms to partially escape the procompetitive effect of contracting: a large stock provides commitment to leave a fraction of the stock uncontracted. In contrast, a small stock provides commitment to sell early, during the most profitable part of the equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number
341.
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Date of creation: 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:341Contact details of provider: Postal: Avda. Vicu� Mackenna 4860, Macul, Santiago Phone: (562) 686-4303 Fax: (562) 553-1664 Email: Web page: http://www.economia.puc.cl More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Forward Trading ; Exhaustible Resources ; Oligopoly Pricing. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: A. Denny Ellerman & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2005.
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Other versions: Salant, Stephen W, 1976.
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Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004.
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Salo, Seppo & Tahvonen, Olli, 2001.
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Dudey, Marc, 1992.
"Dynamic Edgeworth-Bertrand Competition ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Liski, Matti & Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2006.
"Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly ,"
Journal of Economic Theory ,
Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 212-230, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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