Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes
AbstractOverpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington in its series Caepr Working Papers with number 2008-005.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Overpromising; international agreements; treaty compliance; performance measurement; politics and environment; Kyoto Protocol;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Von Fursenberg, G.M. & Daniels, J.P., 1992. "Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989: Examining the Written Record of International Cooperation," Princeton Studies in International Economics 72, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
- Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2008. "Behavioural Finance: A Review and Synthesis," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 14(1), pages 12-29.
- World Bank & International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Global Monitoring Report 2006 : Millennium Development Goals - Strengthening Mutual Accountability, Aid, Trade, and Governance," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 6970, February.
- Wagner, Ulrich J, 2001. " The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements: Economic Theory and Political Economy," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 377-411, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.