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Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games

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Author Info

  • Charles Figuieres

    ()
    (Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, INRA)

  • Frédéric Rychen

    (GREQAM. Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix Marseille, Université Aix-Marseille 2)

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    Abstract

    In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2011/Volume31/EB-11-V31-I1-P41.pdf
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    File URL: http://prodinra.inra.fr/ft?id=E0B723C9-C52A-4826-B7B8-D5970188AE42
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 40409.

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    Length: 426-435
    Date of creation: 2011
    Date of revision:
    Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin
    Handle: RePEc:inr:wpaper:40409

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    Related research

    Keywords:  ; modélisation économiquethéorie des jeux; modèle dynamique; sciences économiques; analyse mathématiqueéquilibre de nash;

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    1. Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
    2. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-64, October.
    3. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    4. Helm, Carsten, 2003. "International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2737-2747, December.
    5. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
    6. Alessandra Casella, 1990. "Participation in a Currency Union," NBER Working Papers 3220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
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