Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games
AbstractIn two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 40409.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Bulletin
Â ; modÃ©lisation Ã©conomiquethÃ©orie des jeux; modÃ¨le dynamique; sciences Ã©conomiques; analyse mathÃ©matiqueÃ©quilibre de nash;
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