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European competition policy modernization: from notification to legal exception

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Author Info

  • Frederic Loss

    (Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers)

  • Estelle Malavolti-Grimal

    (Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien, Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (Laboratoire d'Economie Industrielle, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique)

  • Fabian Berges

    ()
    (Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative, INRA)

Abstract

Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 came into force in May 2004 and replaced the mandatory notification of agreements by a regime of ex post monitoring. This paper shows that ex post monitoring is the optimal audit regime when the competition authority's probability of error is low. On the other hand, the notification system becomes optimal when the competition authority's probability of error is high. The paper also shows that block exemptions and black list (regimes of per se (il)legality) should be implemented when the agreements’ expected welfare impact is very high and very low, respectively.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 22644.

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Length: 77-98
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in European Economic Review
Handle: RePEc:inr:wpaper:22644

Note: JEL : L4 ; D8
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Keywords: COMPETITION POLICY; IMPERFECT AUDIT;

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References

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  1. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Winand Emons, 2002. "Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften dp0211, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
  3. Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Looking behind the curtain--effects from modernization of European Union competition policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 613-624, August.
  4. Winand Emons, . "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1005, American Law & Economics Association.
  5. Petros C. MAVROIDIS & Damien J. NEVEN, 2000. "The Modernisation of EU Competition Policy : Making the Network Operate," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.17, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  6. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-25, June.
  7. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1993. "Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Jean-Philippe Tropeano, 2013. "Ex post or ex ante? On the optimal timing of merger control," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-22, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  2. Ottaviani, Marco & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Ex ante or ex post competition policy? A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 356-359, May.
  3. Will, Birgit E. & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2008. "Fighting cartels: some economics of council regulation (EC) 1/2003," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2008-02, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
  4. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00113503 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Christian Growitsch & Nicole Nulsch & Margarethe Rammerstorfer, 2008. "Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect," IWH Discussion Papers 6, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
  6. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
  7. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00113503 is not listed on IDEAS

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