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Point-record driving licence and road safety: an economic approach

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Author Info

  • Jean Marc Bourgeon

    ()
    (Economie Publique, INRA)

  • Pierre Picard

    (Ecole Polytechnique)

Abstract

Beaucoup de pays ont adoptés des systèmes de permis de conduire à points où les infractions au code de la route font l'objet d'un décompte de points, avec une grande variété de mises en oeuvre. Le retrait de permis est une sanction non-monétaire qui permet au gouvernement de frapper d'incapacité des individus dangereux et qui dissuade aussi la plupart des conducteurs de violer la législation. Les auteurs examinent les dispositifs désirables de ces mécanismes à points et, en particulier, s'il convient de permettre aux conducteurs de récupérer des points et/ou de prévoir une période d'essai pour les conducteurs novices. Ils analysent aussi la complémentarité de ces mécanismes à points avec des amendes et considèrent la possibilité d'un retrait immédiat du permis de conduire pour des violations très graves au code de la route.

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File URL: http://gateway.isiknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?&GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=INRA&SrcApp=INRA&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS&KeyUT=WOS:000244161300011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France in its series Working Papers with number 17820.

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Length: 235-258
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics
Handle: RePEc:inr:wpaper:17820

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Keywords: REPEAT OFFENDERS; NONMONETARY SANCTIONS; AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE; LIABILITY; FINES; MODEL; économiepermis de conduire; sécurité routièreapplication de texte;

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References

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  1. Blackmon, B Glenn, Jr & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1991. "Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 65-69, May.
  2. Winand Emons, 2001. "A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft dp0104, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
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  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2004. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable," NBER Working Papers 10761, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  9. Desjardins, D. & Dionne, G. & Pinquet, J., 2000. "Experience Rating Schemes for Fleets of Vehicules," Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques. 00-03, Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales de Montreal-Chaire de gestion des risques..
  10. Sloan, Frank A & Reilly, Bridget A & Schenzler, Christoph, 1995. "Effects of Tort Liability and Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 49-77, April.
  11. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September.
  12. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "A Model of Optimal Incapacitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 107-10, May.
  13. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Hu, Sheng-cheng & Huang, Ting-yuan, 2000. "Punishing repeat offenders more severely," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 127-140, March.
  14. Viscusi, W Kip, 1993. "The Value of Risks to Life and Health," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 31(4), pages 1912-46, December.
  15. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
  16. Landes, Elisabeth M, 1982. "Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 49-65, April.
  17. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "A note on the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-247, July.
  18. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
  19. Levitt, Steven D., 1997. "Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 179-192, June.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Mariatiziana Falcone, 2013. "The deterrent effects of the penalty points system for driving offences: a regression discontinuity approach," Empirical Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 965-985, October.
  2. Jean Pinquet, 2012. "Experience rating in non-life insurance," Working Papers, HAL hal-00677100, HAL.
  3. Benedettini, Simona & Nicita, Antonio, 2012. "The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 256-270.
  4. Dionne, Georges & Michaud, Pierre-Carl & Pinquet, Jean, 2013. "A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 85-97.
  5. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Mariatiziana Falcone, 2010. "The Deterrent Effects of Penalty Point System in Driving Licenses: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Working Papers, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica) 201004, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica).
  6. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2007. "Point-record incentives, asymmetric information and dynamic data," Working Papers, HAL hal-00243056, HAL.
  7. Georges Dionne, 2012. "The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 1233, CIRPEE.
  8. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet & Denise Desjardins, 2006. "Perception of the Risks Associated with Impaired Driving and Effects on Driving Behavior," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 0608, CIRPEE.
  9. Antonio Nicita & Simona Benedettini, 2012. "The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena, Department of Economics, University of Siena 631, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  10. Marcello Basili & Filippo Belloc & Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2012. "Warning, Learning and Compliance: Evidence from Micro-data on Driving Behavior," Department of Economics University of Siena, Department of Economics, University of Siena 639, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
  11. Georges Dionne & Claude Fluet & Denise Desjardins, 2007. "Predicted risk perception and risk-taking behavior: The case of impaired driving," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 237-264, December.
  12. Chandler, Vincent, 2012. "Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System," MPRA Paper 39439, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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