AbstractWe consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions in the intermediate domain. We also show that a social choice function is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a meet social choice function.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 11-06.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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