Roberts' theorem with neutrality: A Social welfare ordering approach
AbstractWe consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an m-dimensional open interval, where m is the number of alternatives. When the type space of every agent is unrestricted, Roberts' theorem with neutrality (Roberts, 1979) becomes a corollary to our result. Our proof technique uses a social welfare ordering approach, commonly used in aggregation literature in social choice theory. We also prove the general (affine maximizer) version of Roberts' theorem for unrestricted type spaces of agents using this approach.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 10-03.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 283-298.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-17 (All new papers)
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