This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Wiji Arulampalam () (University of Warwick, UK)
Sugato Dasgupta () (Jawaharlal Nehru Univesity, New Delhi)
Amrita Dhillon () (University of Warwick, UK)
Bhaskar Dutta () (University of Warwick, UK)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974-75 to 1996-97. We ?nd that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16 higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.isid.ac.in/~pu/dispapers/dp08-14.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 08-14.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:08-14

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi - 110016
Phone: 91-11-6564789
Fax: 91-11-6856779
Web page: http://www.isid.ac.in
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Shamprasad M. Pujar).

Related research
Keywords: Redistributive Politics; Alignment; Swing; Electoral Competition;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Khemani, Stuti, 2007. "Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 464-484, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 1998. "Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 153-180, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Johansson, E., 1999. "Intergovernmental Grants As A Tactical Instrument: Some Empirical Evidence from Swedish Municipalities," Papers 1999:10, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
    Other versions:
  4. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Andrew Leigh, 2008. "Bringing Home the Bacon: An empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 580, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Valentino Larcinese & Leonzio Rizzo & Cecilia Testa, 2005. "Allocating the US Federal Budget to the States: the Impact of the President," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 03, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kevin Milligan & Michael Smart, 2005. "Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rajashri Chakrabarti, 2005. "Gains from a Redrawing of Political Boundaries: Evidence from State Reorganization in India," Others 0512002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.