Deterrence, preemption and panic: A Common-enemy problem of terrorism
AbstractWe develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counterterrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implications for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the dictum: "offense is the best defense." Further, it examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 08-04.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Terrorism; Preemption; Panic; Deterrence; Cooperation; Target Countries;
Other versions of this item:
- Das, Satya P. & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2008. "Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism," MPRA Paper 8223, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F52 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Britta Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
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