Debasis Mishra () (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi) Dolf Talman () (Department of Econometrics & Operations Research and CentER, Tilburg University, Tilburg)
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We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good. We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods. Further, we give characterizations for the minimum and the maximum Walrasian equilibrium price vectors of this economy. Using our characterizations, we give a suncient set of rules that generates a broad class of ascending and descending auctions in which truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General