This paper explores the relationship between financial intermediation and employment. We explain why some economies have low financial intermediation even when financial intermediation is safe. Moreover, we seek to explain why these economies tend to be poor and vulnerable, and also have large self-employment even when the latter has low productivity. We model safe but unsound banks and show that the effects of bad banking can be overcome only partially by corrective taxes. The model is extended to incorporate the illegal sector of the economy as well as the labor laws.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Rafael La porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002.
"Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, 06.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Simon Johnson et al., 2000.
"Tunneling,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 22-27, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Simon Johnson & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000.
"Tunnelling,"
NBER Working Papers
7523, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli, 2000.
"Household Portfolios in Italy,"
CSEF Working Papers
43, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: