An analysis of corporate performance and governance in India: Study of some selected industries
AbstractCorporate governance mechanisms have been an important issue of enquiry for the researchers in financial economics. Both theoretical models and empirical analysis have been developed in this area to expalin the occurrence of different contractual mechanisms and thier efficacy in terms of improving managerial performance. A related issue in this literature is the independence and competence of the Board of Directors. The Indian corporate scenario was more or less stagnant till the early 90s but, after the liberalisation of the 90s, the position and goals of the Indian corporate sector changed a lot. This paper, using only balance sheet inforamtion from 4 selected sectors of the Indian industry, analyses the efficacy of corporate governance. Our findings, by and large, paint a diappointing picture. Overall, the conclusion seems to be that corporate governance is still in a very nascent stage in the Indian industry. The decision and policy making is still taken mostly as a routine matte. Among the institutional investors also, it seems that the FIIs are the most consistent in stock picking whereas the performances of the domestic institutional investors are sporadic and volatile at best. This is also serious shortcoming on the part of the capital market, not being able to enforce better governance on the part of the directors or performance on the part of the managers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 04-19.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Corporate governance; Agency problem; R&D; Import; Borrowing; Equity; Utilization of capital; Regression model; Correlation coefficient;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CFN-2004-09-30 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CWA-2004-09-30 (Central & Western Asia)
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