Limit properties of Bertrand equilibria with exogenous entry
AbstractFor a large class of demand and cost functions, we characterize the limit equilibrium set under Bertrand oligopoly when entry is exogenous. Unless average cost is constant, we find that the folk theorem of perfect competition necessarily fails. We also relate our results to those in Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 04-14.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Bertrand oligopoly; limit properties; exogenous entry; folk theorem;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Perfect Competition
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-06-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2004-06-22 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2004-06-02 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, June.
- Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 1995. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Bertrand Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 19-32, January.
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
- Novshek, William, 1980. "Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 473-86, April.
- Okuguchi, Koji, 1973. "Quasi-Competitiveness and Cournot Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 145-48, January.
- Novshek, William & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2003. "Bertrand equilibria with entry: limit results," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 795-808, June.
- Dixon, Huw, 1990. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 131-46, December.
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