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Marriage markets with externalities

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Author Info
Prabal Roy Chowdhury () (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

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Abstract

This paper examines a marriage market with externality. We first develop an appropriate notion of stability for this market, called E-stability. We provide an example to show that an E-stable outcome need not exist. We then derive conditions under which an E-stable outcome exists.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India in its series Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers with number 04-11.

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Length: 11 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ind:isipdp:04-11

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Related research
Keywords: Marriage model; stability; externalities;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Sonmez, Tayfun, 1996. "Implementation in generalized matching problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 429-439. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Prabal Ray Chaudhuri, 1997. "Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 335-360. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ayþe Mumcu & Ismail Saglam, 2008. "Rationalizability of one-to-one matchings with externalities," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(33), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
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