References listed on IDEAS
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1. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 13-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Steffen Huck & Joerg Oechssler, 1995. "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations," Game Theory and Information 9507001, EconWPA, revised 27 Aug 1998. [Downloadable!]
   • S. Huck & J. Oechssler, . "The Indirect Evolutionary Approach To Explaining Fair Allocations," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 1996-13, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 1999. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Game Theory and Information 9903001, EconWPA, revised 12 Mar 1999. [Downloadable!]
3. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. repec:att:wimass:199612r is not listed on IDEAS
5. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
   Other versions:
   • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   • Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated games Played by Finite Automata," Papers 90-17, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
6. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, . "A Theory of Reciprocity," IEW - Working Papers iewwp006, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
   • Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001. "A Theory of Reciprocity," CEPR Discussion Papers 3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. repec:att:wimass:19199934 is not listed on IDEAS
11. Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Discussion Paper 37, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Margin Dufwenberg & Georg Kirchsteiger, 2001. "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000090, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1030, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1483, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2001. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," General Economics and Teaching 0012002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    • Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Economics Working Papers 441, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000. [Downloadable!]
    • Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin., 2000. "Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model," Economics Working Papers E00-283, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
13. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
15. Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 1997. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Working Papers 97-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Kockesen, Levent & Ok, Efe A. & Sethi, Rajiv, 2000. "The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 274-299, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Akerlof, George A, 1976. "The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-617, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. repec:att:wimass:199529 is not listed on IDEAS
21. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Somanathan, E., 1997. "Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 253-265, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
24. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-073e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 2000-05, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
25. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Bisin, Alberto & Verdier, Thierry, 2001. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 298-319, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1997. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences," DELTA Working Papers 97-03, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
27. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
29. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David K Levine, 1997. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2047, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
30. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
31. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
33. Robert W. Rosenthal, 2001. "Trust and social efficiencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 413-428. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Guth, Werner, 1995. "An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 323-44.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Game Theory and Information 0412005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Vengefulness Evolves in Small Groups," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1017, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
2. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Driving Forces of Informal Sanctions," IEW - Working Papers iewwp059, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
3. Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Equilibrium Vengeance," MPRA Paper 4321, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2002. "Equilibrium Vengeance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
5. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2002. "Norm compliance and strong reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-03, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2001. "Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 01-09-048, Santa Fe Institute.
6. Dennis A.V. Dittrich, 2004. "Wages, Length of Relationship and Bargaining Power: An experimental study in a world of complete contracts," Discussion Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
7. Emrah Arbak & Laurence Kranich, 2005. "Can Wages Signal Kindness?," Working Papers 0511, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
8. Basov, S., 2001. "An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 812, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
9. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Fehr, Ernst & Henrich, Joseph, 2003. "Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaption? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism," CEPR Discussion Papers 3860, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Fehr, Ernst & Henrich, Joseph, 2003. "Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism," IZA Discussion Papers 712, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Ernst Fehr & Joseph Henrich, 2003. "Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
11. Ofer H. Azar, 2003. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping," Others 0309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve?: The case of tipping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Akiko Maruyama, 2007. "On the coexistence of reciprocity and materialism," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(59), pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]
13. Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Transparency and Reciprocal Behavior in Employment Relations," IZA Discussion Papers 887, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sliwka, Dirk, 2005. "Transparency and reciprocal behavior in employment relations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 383-403, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes," Game Theory and Information 0412003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Daniel Friedman & Nirvikar Singh, 2003. "Negative Reciprocity: The Coevolution of Memes and Genes," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1028, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz. [Downloadable!]
15. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Carpenter, Jeffrey & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2006. "Altruism and Climate," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 643, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Weibull, Jörgen & Alger, Ingela, 2006. "Altruism and Climate," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 633, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 31 Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
17. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity," Discussion Papers in Economics 14, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers iewwp075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 2703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -- Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]