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Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State

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  • Christian Harm
  • Joshua Charap
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    Abstract

    This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy. A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy. Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption. Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by International Monetary Fund in its series IMF Working Papers with number 99/91.

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    Length: 24
    Date of creation: 01 Jul 1999
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:99/91

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    Cited by:
    1. Huff, W. G. & Dewit, G. & Oughton, C., 2001. "Credibility and Reputation Building in the Developmental State: A Model with East Asian Applications," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 711-724, April.
    2. Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Bad Politicians," NBER Working Papers 8532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Pritchett, Lant, 2000. "The tyranny of concepts - CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated Investment Effort) is NOT capital," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2341, The World Bank.
    4. Laurila, Juhani & Singh, Rupinder, 2000. "Sequential reform strategy: The case of Azerbaijan," BOFIT Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition 8/2000, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
    5. Philippe Le Billon, 2003. "Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 413-426.
    6. Ronen Bar-El, 2009. "Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 29-44, January.

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